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1 .S I "HEREFORE

An analysis of the Utah capital felony sentencing
statute reveals that no provision has been made to insure
that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth
in the statute were properly considered by the sentencing
authority.

The statute does not compel the making of any

written findings as to any of the factors set forth.

It

appears that the trial court or jury could disregard any or
all of the mitigating factors and the defendant would be at
a loss as to the factors which influenced the judgment imposed.

The trial court or jury is insulated from having to

justify its decision on the sentence imposed.

This inherent

defect permits the same opportunity for the arbitrariness
and caprice condemned by the Furman decision, and meaningful
appellate review of the sentence imposed is thereby precluded.
The reviewing court has nothing to refer to in determining
whether the aggravating and mitigating circumstances were
properly considered, or considered at all, or whether the
sentence imposed was the result of passion or prejudice.
In July of 1976 the United States Supreme Court
rendered five landmark decisions dealing with the death
penalty, three of which have direct application to the
instant case.

The Court appears to have concerned itself

with the measures taken by each state to insure the integrity
of the sentence imposed.

The Court was not safisfied merely

with whether the statute in each state permited consideration
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of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but constantly made reference to additional procedural safeguards such as provision for automatic appellate review of
each death sentence, requiring the making of written findings to support a sentence of death mandatory, or whether
the evidence supported such findings, and whether the
sentence imposed was disproportionate compared to those
sentences imposed in similar cases.
In Gregg v. Georgia, U.S.49 L.Ed.2d 859,96 S.Ct, the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Georgia death penalty statute and made reference to several of the safeguards referred to above.

Specifically, the

jury in Georgia is required to find a statutory aggravating
circumstance before recommending a sentence of death.

The

Georgia statute also provides for automatic appeal of all
death sentences to the State Supreme Court.

On review,the

Court is required by statute to "review each sentence of
death and determine whether it was imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, whether the evidence
supports the jury's findings of statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether the sentence is disproportionate
compared to those sentences imposed in similar cases."
In Proffitt v. Florida U.S. 49 L.Ed.2a 913,96 S.Ct.
United States Supreme Court upheld the consitutionality of
thatstate's death penalty by stating that the sentencing

-3-
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Judge is required to impose the death penalty on all first
degree murderers as to whom the statutory aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating factors.

The statute

requires that if the trial court imposes a sentence of
death,
"it shall set forth in writing its findings
upon which the sentence of death is based as
to the facts: (a) that sufficient statutory
aggravating circumstances exist..,(b) that
there are insufficient statutory mitigating
circumstances." Fla. Stat. Ann.Sec.921.141(3)
It should also be noted that the Florida statute provides for automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida
in all cases where the death sentence has been imposed.
Fla.Stat. Ann. Sec. 921.141(4).

As a result of the above

provisions, meaningful appellate review of each sentence of
death is made possible since the judge must justify the
imposition of the death sentence with written findings.
In Jurek v. Texas, U.S.49L.Ed.2d 576, 96 S.Ct., the
United States Supreme Court upheld the Texas statute which
required that after a verdict finding a person guilty of one
of five specified murder categories the jury must answer the
following three questions:
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable response to the provocation, if any by
the deceased." Texas Code Crim.Proc.,Art.37.071(b)
The death sentence is imposed if the jury finds that the
State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer
to each of the three questions is yes; a sentence of life
imprisonment results if it finds that the answer to any
question is in the negative.

Thus, the sentence of death

in Texas is dependent upon the jury making a specific finding of yes or no as to each of the three questions involved.
The Texas statute also provides for an expedited review by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
By comparing the capital sentencing statutes of
Georgia, Florida and Texas with the Utah statute in question,
Sec. 76-3-207, it is apparent that the framers were remiss
in failing to incorporate into the statute language of a
mandatory nature requiring that the sentencing authority give
proper consideration to the mitigating factors and that it
justify its determination of death by written findings.
The transcript in the instant case reveals that the
trial court in reaching it's decision to impose the death
penalty on appellant addressed itself to only one of the
mitigating factors set forth in Section 76-3-207, to wit:
(d) at the time of the murder, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to
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the requirement of law was substantially
impaired as a result of mental disease,
intoxication, or influence of drugs. (See T.647)
The Court apparently did not take into consideration
or even discuss the other mitigating circumstances contained
in that section and which the court had a duty to consider.
The Court made no reference to the young age of appellant,
stated to be between 20 and 22 years of age at the time of
the crime; made no reference to the minimal participation
by appellant in the crime; and made no reference to the
deprived background of appellant.

These were all proper

areas of inquiry which should have been addressed by the
Court and which should have entered into the decision as to
life imprisonment or death.

The failure of the Court to

set forth in writing any findings, or to set forth in its
justification of the death penalty, (T. 645-650) has the
effect of withholding from the reviewing court information
necessary to determine whether the sentence imposed was the
result of passion or prejudice.

-6-
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CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits that Section
76-3-207 Utah Code Annotated is unconstitutional since
it does not embody adequate procedural safeguards to
insure that arbitrariness and caprice do not enter into
the sentence imposed.

The statute does not meet the test

of the Furman decision and does not contain the procedural
safeguards alluded to in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek.
The judgment rendered at trial should be reversed
and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial,
or in the alternative, an Order should be issued setting
aside the sentence of death and remanding the cause to the
trial court for the imposition of the sentence of life
imprisonment.

Respectfully submitted,

I hereby certify that on this 9th day of September,1976
I personally served upon the Attorney General of the State of
Utah three copies of the above and foregoing Amended and
Supplemental Brief of Appellant by personally delivering said
three copies to the office of the Attorney General.
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